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The article provides a reading, from a psychoanalytic point of view, of Japanese writer 
Kanai Mieko’s short tale Boshizô (Portrait of Mother and Child), published in 1992, as a 
“twisted” or “contorted” parable of the construction of female subjectivity. Establishing 
connections between the form and the content of the novel, the essay analyzes how 
Kanai’s use of the rhetorical figure of the chiasmus structures the internal narrative of the 
novel at the same time that it reflects the process of formation of female subjectivity and 
desire. The novel becomes, thus, a staging of the female Oedipus complex which plays 
out its twists.  
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From the first lines of Boshizô (Portrait of Mother and Child, 1992), we know 
we are in Kanai’s fictional world2. Lying in bed, an unnamed female 
                                               
1 I would like to acknowledge the invaluable support and wise critiques of Alan Tansman, Dan 
O’Neill, Carolyn Porter, Sharlyn Sazawa, Sharalyn Orbaugh, and Yoko Tateoka with my 
graduate thesis work on Kanai Mieko’s short fiction from which this essay comes. Most of all, 
my profound gratitude to the author herself and her sister, artist Kanai Kumiko, for their 
generous and patient responses to all my enthusiastic musings and queries over the years. 
2 Kanai Mieko (b. 1947) is a contemporary woman writer who debuted in Japan at only nineteen 
with her poetry and the story, “Love Life” (Ai no seikatsu, 1967). Since then, a three-volume 
collection of her short stories has come out, two volumes of poetry, collections of her essays, 
children’s stories, and several novels. She is a prolific film and cultural critic as well, and so 
besides her serialized fiction, her essays appear in newspapers and journals on a regular basis. 
Her essays are intellectually playful and somewhat acerbic in their wit, while her fiction tends to 
be stylistically experimental with long, lyrical sentences that in their sensuous attention to color, 
motion, time, and space evoke cinematic qualities. Works translated into English include her 
stories “Platonic Love”, (trans. Amy Vladeck Heinrich), “Rabbits” (trans. Phyllis Birnbaum), 
“Rotting Meat” (trans. Mary Knighton), excerpts from her long work Treading on Soft Earth, 
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protagonist is awakened by a smell in her room, a stench really, as of an 
animal-like presence. This smell transmutes itself subsequently into a 
disembodied voice. In medias res, this voice begins a story that will become 
the internal narrative to the female listener’s frame story in Kanai Mieko’s 
short tale Boshizô. Uncannily intimate to its listener, the voice is yet outside 
and foreign. In this way, Kanai’s story presents a scene of fantasy enclosed 
and framed by a voice that resembles less a narrator per se than an 
inscrutable message from the big Other of Lacanian psychoanalytic dis-
course. For us as readers, the demanding task of endlessly making sense of 
this “message” overtakes the goal of finally “getting it”; that is, Boshizô as 
symbolic parable demonstrates how Lacanian psychoanalysis is fundamen-
tally concerned with the necessary incommensurabilities and slippages 
involved in “translation”: translation between individual subjectivities, be-
tween cultures, and between the self divided from itself. In my reading here, 
Kanai’s story stages at several levels a “crossing over” of languages, 
disciplines, cultures, and psychic registers, and its primary means of doing 
so is effected by the rhetorical figure of the chiasmus. The stakes of this 
crossing are, I believe, grounded in rituals of contestation and transgression 
–what “translation” in its myriad significations is all about– rather than 
coherence, fidelity, and harmony, translation’s ostensible goal3.  
The story opens with the voice from the internal narrative claiming “I 
couldn’t help but love him because, of course, there was nothing else for me 
to do” (551). We quickly find out that the speaker is a young beautiful girl 
                                                                                                              
which appeared in TriQuarterly (trans. Sarah Teasley), and most recently, a representative 
collection of stories, The Word Book (trans. Paul McCarthy).   
3 In valorizing the footnote-encumbered monster of literal translation over the so-called popular 
and harmonious one, Vladimir Nabokov puts his case somewhat differently than I mean to do 
here but he expresses his caustic disdain at the standards of “readability” in a memorable way: 
“I constantly find in reviews of verse translations the following kind of thing that sends me into 
spasms of helpless fury: «Mr. (or Miss) So-and-so’s translation reads smoothly». In other words, 
the reviewer of the «translation» who neither has, nor would be able to have, without special 
study, any knowledge whatsoever of the original, praises as «readable» an imitation only 
because the drudge or the rhymster has substituted easy platitudes for the breathtaking 
intricacies of the text. «Readable», indeed! A schoolboy’s boner is less of a mockery in regard 
to the ancient masterpiece than its commercial interpretation or poetization. «Rhyme» rhymes 
with «crime», when Homer or Hamlet are rhymed. The term «free translation» smacks of 
knavery and tyranny. It is when the translator sets out to render the «spirit» –not the textual 
sense– that he begins to traduce his author. The clumsiest literal translation is a thousand times 
more useful than the prettiest paraphrase” (Nabokov, 1992: 127). Among required readings on 
translation theory one usually finds Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator” (1968). In 
this essay, Benjamin argues that the translation is a different work from the original and has a 
life of its own. The translation should not reflect but rather illuminate the original, while also 
pushing the limits of one’s own language to perceive a foreign language as yet kin. For 
Benjamin, the ideal translation is one that unifies the seemingly opposing and irreconcilable 
translation goals of literalness and freedom. One “vocal image” used by Benjamin that I find to 
resonate provocatively with my allusions to the Lacanian big Other with its echo of “Che vuoi?” 
could well serve as the epigraph to my essay here: “Unlike a work of literature, translation does 
not find itself in the center of the language forest but on the outside facing the wooded ridge; it 
calls into it without entering, aiming at that single spot where the echo is able to give, in its own 
language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one” (Benjamin, 1968: 76). 
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who, while surrounded by admiring young men, has eyes only for “him”. The 
term ano hito is used here to refer to this “him” and, in context, it takes on 
the sense of kare as used colloquially in Japanese to designate one’s lover 
or boyfriend; moreover, from the beginning, both kanji characters for “love” 
appear, as seen in the verb aisuru (552) and the form watashi no koi (552), 
leaving little doubt of the sexualized nature of the relationship. Despite this 
apparent intimacy, however, we discover the relationship is also curiously 
distant, marked by a “gaze” (mitsumeru, chuushippanashi) that simulta-
neously separates and connects them. With no mention of ano hito returning 
her passionate gaze, she instead insists upon the intensity of her own: “In 
order to learn everything about him, to know his deepest secrets, I would 
stare at him ceaselessly –I could think of nothing but sacrificing myself for 
him” (553). The very repetition of lines such as this reinforces the power of 
the gaze, structuring the violence and restraint of a narratorial desire that 
can be fulfilled only in looking4.   
We do not yet get an inkling of who this “he” is for some pages into the 
story; what we do find out, however, are how the desirous advances of other 
young men are encouraged only to be refused; how these young men tell 
her that her attraction to kare is “abnormal” (ijou, 553); and how her own 
objective is to become nothing less than the perfect object of male desire. 
She strives to become an eternal virgin (eien no shojo, 554) emanating the 
lustful heat of a prostitute.  
 
As if mad with desire, like a prostitute hunting for customers –even 
going so far as to give coy, provocative looks– I worked hard to get 
men completely obsessed with me. As a virgin I would reign among 
these men and, for his sake, thereby make my body into an eternal 
sacrifice. Or perhaps, in the sacred rites of a festival orchestrated by 
him I would be the virgin shamaness, the miko. (554) 
 
She strives to maintain a suffering position, “sacrificing” her body’s own 
strong desires in response to others’ “for his sake” (since they will not or 
cannot get together, she will, it appears, have no one); simultaneously 
though, she claims the elevated, victorious stance of the desired object who 
rejects the attentions of young men who only want her for her body. The 
language at this point in the story has become notably lofty in tone, as she 
refers to herself as a miko, or virgin shamaness, using her body as medium 
for containing the desires of others without itself being contaminated by 
them. She connects kare to her quasi-religious yet sexualized function as an 
“eternal virgin”: “He was always inside of me, so that though I might go deep 
into the darkness inside, wavering and uncertain, beyond and ahead I would 
                                               
4 For more detailed Lacanian explorations of the link between voice and gaze, see Saleci and 
Žižek (1996). 
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see the lightsource of a brilliant, shining bliss; so even though I might go 
deep into the darkness inside, because I knew he was there beyond, I could, 
freely, taste the happiness of being a woman” (553-554).  
Here we get the image of an individual taking “uncertain”, somehow 
risky, steps in the world yet being protected by a curiously deified male figure 
who is simultaneously internal (“always inside of me”) and external (“there 
beyond”). Even at its most self-righteous, however, the narrator uses lan-
guage that is startlingly sexual in its imagery: “he was always deep inside of 
me” leading up to “the lightsource of a brilliant, shining bliss”, that culminates 
in “the happiness of being a woman”. It is not until half-way through the story 
that we explicitly find out who the object of her tortured, distant, and 
circumlocutious desire is.  
 
If you wonder why I had to go through all of this, it was because he 
was my father. I never even once wished he hadn’t been. On the con-
trary, if my father had not been tied to me by blood (how strange to 
so much as imagine!) I probably would never have loved him. That 
we had the same blood flowing in our veins, that we really did look a 
lot alike –these things were important. That he was my father, that I 
was his daughter: there was nothing more important than this. (554)   
 
Our understanding now of this love as the incestuous feelings of a 
daughter for her father, along with the sexualized descriptions of a desire 
ceaselessly fueled by its deferral and displacement, retroactively alters the 
earlier language of distant, idolatrous love. She makes clear that it is 
precisely her father’s being prohibited and his kinship, not to mention the 
narcissism embedded in her claim that they “really did look a lot alike”, that 
underpin her desires. Still, we are not sure to what extent her incestuous 
feelings are reciprocated because the daughter is so quick to describe for us 
how her father’s failure to acknowledge her desire mirrors her own eroticized 
suffering and self-denial. 
 
Yet, he continued to pretend not to notice. But wasn’t it a truly 
impossible thing for him, while receiving the exclusive attention of 
one woman, to have to continue to pretend not to notice? Not to 
mention that since it was only the two of us, my father and myself, 
occasionally just by everyday conversation or some small casual act, 
we would be like the skin of a balloon stretched tight, filled to 
bursting with our dangerous, sweet suffering. (554-555) 
  
We get explicit reference here to the absence of the mother, there being 
only the two of them, and a description of their everyday interaction as 
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heightened yet restrained passion, even if only on her side; we get nothing 
from the perspective of the father to confirm or refute her. The emphasis in 
this passage on “pretending” by the father is, moreover, suspect, implying 
that the daughter has no reason to believe her desire is reciprocated but 
instead justifies her own desire in the imagined return of it in his unselfish 
and stoic denial of his real feelings for her. 
The language of desire, like a “balloon stretched tight”, tells us that there 
has to be a breaking point to this tension, and it comes in the form of an 
automobile accident that leaves the daughter’s face disfigured and her leg 
amputated; the father is unscarred but loses his memory and ability to 
speak. After the accident, they move away from their old friends to a place 
isolated and remote where no one knew them and where they live together 
in seclusion. “We’d moved to a place where no one knew us as father and 
child” (555). It is only then –when neither the daughter nor the father is an 
object of others’ desire; when there is no one to gaze upon and witness their 
transgression; when the father has no memory of his relationship as father to 
his daughter– that the incest can take place. “[W]hen night came, we slept 
like lovers in the same bed. With a strange happiness and uneasiness, 
together. For my father’s sake I had already found it unnecessary to lock 
myself up in the chastity of an eternal virgin” (556).  
This relationship goes on for about a year until, one night, in mid-
embrace, suddenly he cries out to her in his first word since the accident and 
the only word we get from him anywhere in the story: “Facing me and as if 
calling for me –“Mother”– he said. Hearing that, I resolved to take on this 
new existence he had given name to. So, while I did not doubt that I myself 
was his mother, at the same time, the son before me was my father” (556).  
With this, the story switches back to the frame narrative for an abrupt 
conclusion, the voice and smell fading away as the woman lies in her bed 
alone in the dark. 
We as readers, too, are left in the dark; that is, is the man her father or 
her son? Who is that other female character lying in bed and why is she 
made privy to this story? How do we make sense of this bizarre, incestuous 
tale? After some time pondering the evidence, one might decide that the 
male character is indeed her father, thereby affirming the truth and stability 
of the first part of the internal narrative before the accident and according her 
lines at the story’s end a degree of validity; in other words, she really is his 
daughter but, fine, if he wants her to be his mother from now on, she will 
gladly play that role to make him happy. One could argue that the greater 
part of the story is taken up by the description of her as daughter to the 
father, and that her unreliable and contradictory narration is actually the 
language of an incest victim who loves her father yet has to “pretend” and 
delude herself to rationalize the unspeakable taboo in which she is 
immersed; to this one might add that incest between father and daughter is 
more likely and plausible in general than that between mother and son. On 
the other hand, however, we find this interpretation easily countered by 
evidence for mother-son incest not only in the title itself, Portrait of Mother 
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and Child (not “Portrait of Father and Child”) but also in the widespread 
belief in Japan that incest between mother and son is more common than 
that between father and daughter. The phenomenon of “maza con”, or moth-
er complexes, and anecdotes of mothers sexually easing their sons’ tensions 
during the stressful periods of “exam hell” are familiar social and cultural 
discussions in Japan5. In the end, how do we make sense of these seeming-
ly irreconcilable interpretations of Boshizô? How can we “translate” across 
the linguistic and socio-cultural gaps we see widening here? My method 
from here on will be less to resolve or reconcile these differences and more 
to complicate and intensify them by closely reading psychoanalytic fictions 
against Kanai’s tale and the interpretations it raises. My methodological aim 
is to find my way to content via form, and work back through content again, 
so that by the end form and content in this story have cracked each other 
open, revealing a literally and deliberately “twisted” parable of subjectivity. 
It is at this point that we must proceed by way of detour to the meanings 
of the chiasmus: a chiasmus is a rhetorical figure that literally derives from 
the Greek for the letter x, and means “to cross”, twist, or invert. Generally in 
poetry or prose form, the chiasmus appears according to the scheme abba, 
and it is sometimes a palindrome. As M.H. Abrams tells us in his Glossary of 
Literary Terms, the chiasmus is “a sequence of two phrases or clauses which 
are parallel in syntax, but reverse the order of the corresponding words”6. He 
gives an example in prose from Shelley’s Defense of Poetry (1821): “Poetry 
is the record of the best and happiest moments of the happiest and best 
minds” (emphasis added). This inversion in syntax need not be entire or 
even exact, however, since inversion may be suggested in alliteration (an f-
sound + p-sound, p-sound + f-sound) or effected by the forms of speech 
themselves (verb + adverbial clause, adverbial clause + verb); consider, for 
example, “He went to the theater, but home went she”7. My contention is that 
the chiasmus quite literally structures the form of the internal narrative in 
Boshizô, with the daughter and father reversing in the center of the story to 
become mother and son; that is, the chiasmus form is that child and parent 
reverse to become parent and child. We may add gender and modify this to 
construct a double cross: the female child and male parent become the male 
child and female parent. The chiasmus structures not only the overall interior 
narrative in this way, but also key sentences in Boshizô. 
For example, we first find the chiasmus in the opening of the story while 
still in the exterior narrative. The exterior narrator comments on the voice 
and smell that has awakened her in this way: “It was then that I noticed how 
                                               
5 For more on mother-son incest and “maza con”, see Anne Allison’s (2000), especially “Trans-
gressions of the Everyday: Stories of Mother-Son Incest in Japanese Popular Culture” (123-
146). 
6 The examples here are borrowed from Abrams (1985: 160-163). 
7 See the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language entry for “chiasmus” (1976: 
232). An additional example from Abrams that may be useful to show the variations of the 
chiasmus is taken from W. B. Yeats’s “An Irish Airman Foresees his Death”: “The years to come 
seemed waste of breath,/ A waste of breath the years behind” (1985: 162). 
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difficult it was to separate the voice from the smell –had the voice become 
the smell? The smell the voice?– so that, in the end, they were one and the 
same thing” (552, koe ga nioi ni natta no ka, nioi ga koe ni natta no ka). The 
chiasmus of voice/smell/voice serves to underscore the literal questioning, 
then erasing of, distinctions between the two terms voice and smell until 
“they”, multiple terms, become “one”. The Möbius-strip quality of the chias-
mus is most clear in such sentences as this; that is, much as a two-sided 
strip of paper becomes one-sided in a topological trick so do the two terms 
reverse in such a way as to suggest that they are all on the same “side”, all 
of “one” piece. Significantly, the presence of the chiasmus in the exterior 
narrative suggests something about the relationship between the exterior 
and interior narratives as well; just as the smell-voice has penetrated her 
room and her consciousness, her conscious and unconscious mind may be 
of a piece with the interior narrative and, indeed, shaping it. The chiasmus 
poses topological questions about just what is inside and what is outside: Is 
the voice/smell her consciousness or her unconscious? Is the voice from 
inside or outside? Is her unconscious ventriloquizing as rebus the interior 
narrative for the exterior narrator?8 The chiasmus sets up the “magic” of such 
reversals and the apparently “supernatural” quality of the opening scene9. 
Another chiasmus follows upon this first one in the opening exterior narrative 
when the voice says, “[M]y life was, simply put, my passion for him; this 
passion was my life” (552). Her very being is structured by her desires for 
him, and “they” are inextricably “one”. 
The most significant sentence of the narrative tellingly adopts the 
chiasmus form. It is one calculated to shock and surprise the reader at the 
revelation that it is the father who is the object of the narrator’s desires: “I 
loved him because he was my father and because he was my father for 
being forbidden” (555). As the culminating sentence to the delayed revela-
tion of just who her love object is, this sentence in form and content empha-
sizes the mutually constitutive conditions of the child’s relationship to the 
father. Incest and prohibition, of course, are the keys to and from the Oedipal 
kingdom: the child individuates and receives his gender identity by graduat-
ing from the family romance in which he had desired his mother and at-
tempted rivalry with the father. The Oedipus complex is basically the story of 
                                               
8 In his later writings of the 1970s, Lacan turned to topological figures such as the Möbius-strip 
in order to better express a non-Euclidean order of space and different mode of temporality 
(Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire. Livre XXVI. Le topologie et le temps, 1978-79, unpublished, cited 
in Evans [1996: 207-208; 234]). 
9 Žižek discusses the paradoxical reversals that psychically enable and perpetuate racism and 
anti-Semitism, as well as the ghostly, supernatural quality of the “phantasmatic specter” whose 
support is the petit objet a (the voice or gaze, for example) in his “«I Hear You with My Eyes»; 
or, the Invisible Master” (Saleci and Žižek, 1996: 90-126). One might also turn to Emily Apter 
(1992) to see not only how the concept of the fetish is derived from associations with talismans 
and “magic” but also how the fetish (derived from the mother in psychoanalysis) enacts 
reversals reminiscent of the chiasmus. Like Apter, Moustafa Safouan’s interpretation of Lacan 
on femininity in “Feminine Sexuality in Psychoanalytic Discourse” makes reference to Karl 
Marx’s language of commodity fetishism to explain how objects, and women as sex objects, 
appear to speak (Safouan, 1982). 
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a patriarchal social contract: the male individual in society must accept the 
prohibition of incest with the mother and identify with the Law-giving Symbol-
ic father, receiving in exchange the phallus to mask his castration and 
substitutes for the mother in other heterosexual women exchanged between 
men10. Clearly, this is the boy’s, not the girl’s, development narrative. Incest 
and prohibition structure her story differently, and indeed, the tortured turns 
of the female Oedipus story make the girl child into an exception to the rule 
of the male’s. It may be its very convolutions and implausible turns, however, 
that most usefully parallel the strange twists in subjectivity we get in Boshizô. 
Let us look at the sentence again: “I loved him because he was my 
father and because he was my father for being forbidden”. Her love is 
forbidden love –terms one and four in the chiasmus, the “outside” terms– 
and the reason “because he was my father” –terms two and three, or “inside” 
terms– herein create a reversal of cause and effect, where effect actually 
precedes the cause in order to itself subsume the place of cause; rephrasing 
this more clearly, she loves him not merely because he is her father but 
because loving him is forbidden he is her father. The interior terms to the 
chiasmus reverse to become exterior terms in the second part of the 
sentence, so the interior cause “because he was my father” precedes the 
exterior terms “forbidden love”; as a reader, we follow the necessarily 
forward movement of the sentence’s narration, but the clause “because he 
was my father” both bridges and reverses its own intent, connecting “I loved 
him” with “for being forbidden” at the juncture of the cause-become-effect 
“because he was my father”. That he is forbidden is stressed over his being 
her father, but more importantly, the chiasmus form also suggests that in 
some sense he is her father precisely because he is forbidden. 
In Japanese, the form of the chiasmus is less regular than in the English 
translation but its meaning similarly twists: watashi ga ano hito wo aishita no 
wa chichioya datta kara, soshite sore wo kinshisuru nomo, ano hito ga 
chichioya datta kara deshita. Here there appear to be three rather than two 
or four even balancing “parts” to the chiasmus due to the two commas, but in 
fact, the second “part” actually makes up the first part of the second 
independent clause (beginning with soshite and ending in kara deshita). The 
middle section of the sentence nevertheless separates two independent 
clauses that repeat similar elements while it also modifies and actually 
inverts the first clause’s meaning in the second clause. Looking closely, we 
see that sore refers to the preceding clause watashi ga ano hito wo aishita 
no wa chichioya datta kara, and that it is the “that” which is forbidden (sore 
wo kinshisuru nomo). Literally translating then: “I loved him because he was 
                                               
10 For various takes and retakes on the female Oedipus complex, see: Freud (1953-74), 
especially “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex”, Standard Edition XIX (1924); “Some 
Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes”, SE XIX (1925); 
“Female Sexuality”, SE XXI (1931); and “Femininity”, SE XXII (1933); Jacques Lacan’s Encore 
lectures, Chapters 6 and 7 from Seminar XX (Lacan, 1982). For more on the Oedipus Complex, 
see Lacan (1993). For feminist readings, see Mitchell and Rose (1982); Gallop (1982 and 
1985); Rubin (1975); Irigaray (1993, 1985a and 1985b); De Lauretis (1994).  
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my father/ and despite that being forbidden/ it was because he was my 
father”. The first “because” refers back in Japanese to the first independent 
clause to give us cause (because he was my father) and effect (I loved him); 
but the second “because”, while referring back directionally the same as the 
first clause and seemingly a mere and exact repetition of it, actually alters 
the first in meaning so that the second independent clause asserts effect 
(despite and because of my love’s being forbidden) and cause (he was my 
father). The second “because” can be said to extend to the entire indepen-
dent clause and not just to the “part” of it set off by a comma. The chiasmus 
form acts in the sentence to twist the final terms so that they do not only 
mean “loving him was forbidden because he was my father” but also “he was 
my father because he was forbidden”. Such an understanding of the doubled 
meaning of the sentence in both the English translation and the Japanese 
original, as well as of the cross-over rhetorical effects of the chiasmus, leads 
us in both form and content now to the forbidden and masked desire of the 
girl as it develops in the female Oedipus complex. 
The fact of being the father (“because he was my father”) does not justify 
or serve as reason for the incest and its prohibition between father and 
daughter; rather, it is the love forbidden to female subjects in the Oedipus 
complex, one for which the father is only a mask, that we must consider.  
This forbidden love is that for the mother, every child’s first love object. In 
order for the female subject’s love object to be properly heterosexual, 
however, she must transfer her love away from her mother and to her father 
in an “acceptable” and believable incestuous love that is never fully refuted 
or prohibited just as the turning away from the mother cannot be fully 
prohibited since the girl must desire the father and identify with the mother. 
Consequently, Freud’s oft-reviled and truly convoluted theory of the girl’s 
“penis envy” emerges to roughly parallel the boy’s castration complex, or his 
desire to be the phallus/father for the mother. Unlike the boy, the girl 
undergoes a “double wave of repression”, since she must not only shift her 
love object from mother to father but also her erogenous zone from her 
inferior “little penis” to the vagina. To effect these shifts, the prohibition of the 
girl’s incest with the father is not so much prohibition as encouragement, 
even “seduction”, as feminist critics Jane Gallop and Luce Irigaray have 
pointed out: in the Freudian paradigm she is promised the “penis” in the form 
of a “child” only if she replaces the mother in the triangle with the father, 
while in Lacan’s development and revision of Freud, the girl sees that the 
Phallic mother doesn’t “have” one after all, turns to the father for it but he will 
not give her one so she learns to accept her castration to get what she 
wants, a man like her father who will enable her to “be” the phallus for the 
man (Gallop, 1982; Irigaray, 1993). “Being” the phallus is a state she 
achieves most fully by having a child to serve as a copula, or supplement, 
that masks her Lack; later, this Phallic mother will represent for the boy child 
the mother’s insatiable desire for something that he cannot be or fulfill, 
inaugurating the castration complex. For Lacan, the pre-Oedipal dyad of 
mother-child does not exist; the phallus is always present, structuring the 
relationship into mother-phallus-child. In the Oedipus complex, too, there is 
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no triangle but instead the Lacanian “quaternary” of mother-phallus-child-
father. The phallus inflects relationships so that the girl child desires the 
mother but learns to hate her for her inferiority and castration within 
heterosexual familial arrangements, which is why the girl begins to want 
what she does not have, playing with dolls that lead her to understand how 
to make the equivalency later of child = penis/phallus. This promise is ful-
filled in her assumption of heterosexual relationships and motherhood that 
allows her to usurp the place of her mother by becoming the Phallic mother 
herself. The girl conveniently “forgets”, it seems, her memory of her mother 
as one without “it” in her eagerness to replace the mother by having a child, 
thereby securing the father and the power and legitimacy of her role in the 
family triangle where the structuring role of the phallus remains invisible 
(much as all ideology masks itself to become invisible to what is deemed 
“normal”)11. 
Boshizô, I want to suggest, is a parodic parable of the contortions 
psychoanalysis puts itself through to explain the “exception” of female 
subjectivity and desire. According to psychoanalytic discourse, we can read 
the daughter in Kanai’s story as the daughter all mothers are before they 
become mothers; consequently, the father is the father the daughter is 
encouraged to seduce in order to become the mother, one whose child will 
compensate and substitute for the missing phallus. At the end of the story, 
however, we see that this portrait of mother and child via the father’s 
seduction is not the maternal, sanctified, and self-sacrificing image we 
expected, but instead a portrait of mother-son incest as the logical playing 
out of the female Oedipus complex. The quest for and sublimation of desire 
and power in social and kinship relations that the Oedipus complex 
describes is early hinted at in the story when the daughter tells us that “he 
was always inside of me”, a deifying and gendering simultaneously of the 
phallus and its site in her womb as source of the power and “happiness of 
being a woman”. The image literalizes the Phallic Mother, and in doing so 
parodies the quasi-religious status of both the mother and the phallus in 
psychoanalytic discourse. Itself only six pages in length and allegorically 
presenting its characters in ahistorical time, Boshizô acts as a performative 
parable whose lesson comes to us as a question, and these qualities 
resonate with those of psychoanalysis’s own fictions. J. Hillis Miller’s work 
with the performative dimension of tropes and parables may be apt here: 
 
[F]igures of speech turn aside the telling of a story or a presentation 
of a lyrical theme. This was what initially fascinated me about 
literature, the way it does not straightforwardly say what it means, 
but always says it in terms of some other thing, often by way of what 
seem wildly ungrounded analogies. 
                                               
11 As Althusser says, “Ideology is a «representation» of the Imaginary relationship of individuals 
to their Real conditions of existence” (1971: 161-162).  
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The exploration of this turning gradually leads to the recognition that 
all works of literature are parabolic, “thrown beside” their real 
meaning. They tell one story but call forth something else […] [T]he 
tropological dimension of literature is not local and intermittent, but 
pervasive. Each work is one long trope: an ironic catachresis 
invoking by indirection “something” that can be named in no literal 
way. “Parable” is one name for this large-scale indirection charac-
teristic of literary language, indeed of language generally [...] 
Parables do not merely name the “something” they point to by 
indirection or merely give the reader knowledge of it. They use 
words to try to make something happen in relation to the “other” that 
resonates in the work. They want to get the reader from here to 
there. They want to make the reader cross over into the “something” 
and dwell there. But the site to which parable would take the reader 
is something always other than itself, hence that experience of 
perpetual dissatisfaction. As Kafka put this, “There is a goal but no 
way. What we call the way is only wandering”. Nevertheless, this 
tropological, parabolic, performative dimension enables writing and 
reading to enter history and be effective there, for better or for 
worse. (Hillis Miller, 1991: ix) 
 
Complementary to Miller’s hypothesis that tropes performatively enable 
history and culture to interact with literary texts, Malcolm Bowie argues that 
indeed the rhetorical figure may best facilitate “translation” across cultures 
and disciplines. Rhetorical figures operate in shared fields of language and 
subjectivity, effecting a “cross-over” while preserving differences12. In placing 
such emphasis on the chiasmus as figure of speech and on the parable form 
of Boshizô, I am striving to find the “something” that is Other, that opens up 
to history, and that performs “beside itself” as the inside and outside of 
Kanai’s story. 
Another way to get at this, I think, is by considering more closely how the 
larger narrative, not just individual sentences, is a chiasmus, with its 
narrative twist taking place at the center of the story, after the accident that 
causes the daughter and father to move away to be alone together. Certain 
conditions have to be met to allow the reversal of cause and effect we have 
discussed, a reversal from the first half of the story where she loved him 
because he was her father but without incest, to the latter half of the story 
where she loved him incestuously because he was forbidden. 
 
                                               
12 See Bowie (1993), especially “Comparison Between the Arts: A Psychoanalytic View” (87-
116), where at one point he uses the figure of the chiasmus to bridge the disciplines of literature 
and paintings. 
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We’d moved to a place where no one knew us as father and child. 
And from that point on we had no names. Like Alice lost in the forest 
of the nameless, we completely forgot we were father and child. Like 
Alice and the fawn that ordinarily would never have come so close to 
one another, we were always together. For the sake of everything, it 
was best not to remember. Without saying a word and always sitting 
in that chair, he was as adorable as the doll of a young boy, and 
ceaselessly, I gazed at him. He didn’t grow old. Then, when night 
came, we slept like lovers in the same bed. Together, with a strange 
happiness and uneasiness. (555) 
 
It is no accident that Kanai draws upon Lewis Carroll in a story with 
incest at its core, Carroll’s close relationships with and photographs of little 
girls debated by scholars and biographers not only today but in the Alice 
“boom” of the 1970s in Japan when Boshizô was written. Indeed, Kanai’s 
use of Carroll in her works extends beyond incest, his eroticism also very 
much a part of his charged word play, his striking imagination of a girl’s 
fantasy life, and his unusual scenes of “reversal” and paradox13. One such 
scene of “reversal” is alluded to in the passage above, from Through the 
Looking Glass, when Alice walks into the forest of no names and forgets her 
own name. She encounters a fawn and they walk together, Alice’s arm about 
its neck, as friends instead of natural enemies. At the edge of the forest, 
however, the fawn gladly remembers itself as a fawn and flees Alice in fear 
and recognition of her as “a human child” (Carroll, 1992: 227). Similarly, in 
Boshizô, father and daughter live in a secluded place, in a kind of state of 
nature lost to society much as cultural anthropologist Levi-Strauss describes 
the Real, the realm outside of and prior to the Symbolic, a realm before 
sense. While it is the father who is supposedly amnesic, they both “forget” 
societal rules; the daughter’s words “For the sake of everything, it was best 
not to remember” suggest less her loss of memory than her troubled, willed 
attempts to forget. We see her describe the father as a boy before the 
father’s memory returns to alter her role to that of mother and his to son, 
suggesting that the role reversal had come about already, not with his words 
at the end of the story but in the space of incestuous desire, the Real. But 
just as the fawn’s memory returns and it recalls its place and relations in the 
Symbolic, so too does the “father” have his memory and language return to 
him; his cry “Mother” punctuates their relationship immediately and for the 
future while it also rearranges the order of all other events in the text, 
reversing their relationship in retrospective revelation for the reader14. It is as 
if she has not been the daughter but the mother all along, one whose father 
is also her son; that is, as allegorical daughter never refuting her incestuous 
desire for the father she goes on to consummate it once outside of the 
                                               
13 See Rackin (1991: 153, note 1). For a biography of Lewis Carroll that examines his 
relationship to the prototype of his Alice books, Alice Liddell, see Cohen (1995). 
14 See my discussion of Lacan’s point de capiton via Žižek in Mary A. Knighton (1991).   
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prohibitions of society. It is because of the prohibitions of society that she 
loves someone prohibited only in society, not in nature, someone nominally 
“father” but equally prohibited: the son. At the end of the story we get the 
capsule version of the female Oedipus complex with its twists and 
contortions played out: it is the son with whom she will resume her role as 
“mother” virginal and desirable, yet he, as the son, who always will be “the 
father” for the girl become desiring subject15. In Boshizô, the boy’s coming 
back to language and into the Symbolic to name her “Mother” reminds our 
willfully forgetful mother of her “natural condition” of castration, the frustration 
and privation of desires for power and the father that are only apparently 
assuaged by becoming the Phallic Mother. She is compelled to give over the 
rules of the naming game as a masculine prerogative to a mere boy; even a 
boy has more power to control what and how she is named and must “be” in 
the Symbolic than she herself. What the daughter forgot in the forest of no 
names, it seems, was not her father but her mother, whose “having” the 
phallus does not prevent her erasure from the Symbolic into the blank 
nonsensical Real “being” of it16. 
Parallel to the forest of no names, that domain of Carrollian play and 
nonsense and space of the inaccessible Maternal Real, we find the whole 
internal narrative of Boshizô since it acts as the space of inversion for the 
external speaker’s unconscious from the interior of her self to her conscious-
ness. Moreover, we can understand the interior of the story as really part 
and parcel of the exterior one in the confusion of voice and smell from the 
story’s opening. As the female narrator’s unconscious –indeed, the external 
narrator has just been awakened and may be, just like Alice in the exterior 
narratives of Wonderland, more asleep than awake– the interior narrative 
inscribes the fantasy scene of the unnamed woman who is the daughter and 
mother in the interior narrative. As if from the big Other of Lacanian 
discourse, the site of the Symbolic and of the possibility of language itself, a 
voice comes to the narrator seemingly from outside of herself, strange to 
her, yet it speaks to her familiarly and intimately. For Lacan, the big Other for 
the child is originally the mother, the one whose ministrations to the child’s 
body and needs phallically organizes the child’s cries into a coherent 
“language” of sorts, which serves as a precursor to his or her entry into the 
Symbolic itself17. At this point we must question whether the “Portrait of 
Mother and Child” we have in Boshizô is not daughter-father or even mother-
son after all, but daughter-mother. Perhaps the unconscious of the narrator 
effects a return of the mother not repressed internally in the narrator but 
                                               
15 Both Freud and Lacan relate the doll in the girl’s childhood to her organizing desire for the 
penis/phallus. Freud’s essay on “Femininity” particularly notes that the husband is always a 
child in the eyes of the wife/mother, a point brought home in the cartoon from Manga Goraku, 
December 9, 1994 included in Anne Allison (2000: 128). 
16 See the works of Judith Butler, and on the exception and awkward logic of the heterosexual 
female’s development in psychoanalysis (1990). 
17 References that relate the big Other to the Mother can be found in Lacan 1977 and 1993. See 
also Dylan Evans (1996). 
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censored from the Symbolic of the narrative proper; hence, like foreclosure, 
censorship opens up the possibility of a return of the Real by hallucination to 
disrupt the Symbolic18. Censored from the interior narrative yet the means by 
which its symbolic logic itself is supported, the mother’s banishment to the 
Real allows the phallus to travel from father to son; but, for one brief chias-
matic moment, the Real returns as the interior narrative, an aural hallucina-
tion, to the woman lying in her bed, disrupting the Symbolic order of things. 
Psychoanalyis’s chief goal is to translate the fundamental fantasy of the 
individual and facilitate one’s assumption of his or her appropriate role in 
society; here, the role of analyst seems to fall to us as readers as we 
translate this story across multiple gaps. As I stress in my opening to this 
essay, the goal of making “sense” of this fundamental fantasy scene finally 
overcomes the task of “getting” it in Boshizô; that is to say, interpretation and 
translation across languages and cultures result in an indefinite and over-
determined range of meanings that cannot be fixed, resulting in ever more 
translations and re-translations and interpretations. Kanai’s turn to texts 
outside of the Japanese literary tradition and across languages and cultures 
–the significant allusion to Carroll’s Wonderland books in Boshizô, her 
frequent revisioning of the fables and parables of Kafka and Borges in other 
of her earlier stories, and her knowledge of Western theory and psycho-
analysis amply demonstrated in her critical essays– overwhelmingly multi-
plies the trajectories of her fiction’s “message”. Not simply a “Japanese” 
writer, Kanai Mieko troubles such easy categories and presumptions about 
disciplinary or generic or national boundaries. While some critics in Japan 
deplore the abstract, intellectual, and foreign quality of Kanai’s fiction, 
prominent literary figures such as writer Shibusawa Tatsuhiko and critic 
Yoshikawa Yasuhisa have lauded it for the same reasons, early on noting 
approvingly the semiotic and psychoanalytical allusions wrought by the 
gendered “turn” of the screw in Boshizô, for example19.  
For me, as a feminist literary critic and teacher, psychoanalysis is not the 
key to even such a short, seemingly simple, allegorical parable as Boshizô, 
but it is one key which opens up a Pandora’s box of ever more wide-ranging 
significations, none of which is confined to psychoanalysis but also many, 
perhaps, not adequately explored without recourse to psychoanalysis’s 
fictions of human subjectivity. That female subjectivity remains the twist in 
the normative theory of the human subject makes Boshizô a parody of 
narrative failure in the powerful fictions of Freudian and Lacanian psycho-
analysis; at the same moment, of course, my “translation” here implicitly 
reproduces the insidious ideological work of a daughter’s seduction by its 
                                               
18 See my essay on Kanai’s Ai Aru Kagiri where I raise the question of punctuation as a figure of 
speech, and consider the relationship between foreclosure and the point de capiton. 
19 Shibusawa Tatsuhiko’s (1992 [1974]) review of Kanai’s collection of short stories, Usagi 
(1973), focused on the psychoanalytic twists and Carrollian word play in his favorite story, 
“Boshizô”, while Yoshikawa Yasuhisa (1992) examines at length the recurring use of metaphors 
of water/juice/peaches in Kanai’s oeuvre, which connote female sexuality as a ripening linked to 
the generative semiotic qualities of her écriture féminine.  
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phallic promise. I close by paraphrasing J. Hillis Miller, holding out the space 
of the chiasmatic twist as the “other side” of not only Boshizô but also of the 
psychoanalytic parable, where another story exists “beside itself”, as Other, 
as particular, as historically variable to disrupt such tales’ more totalizing and 
ahistorical tendencies. 
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